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Just Choose: The Jurisprudential
Necessity to Select a Single Governing
Law for Mass Claims Arising from
Nationally Marketed Consumer Goods
and Services
By Elizabeth J. Cabraser*

INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM

Mass-produced consumer goods and standardized financial
services are marketed on a uniform basis to consumers across the
country. Only rarely will the qualities or characteristics of these
products differ significantly depending upon the state or region in
which they are sold. The era of the localized manufacturer-sellerbuyer relationship is long gone. The face-to-face transaction is no
longer the norm in our society or in our economy, but the law
persists in treating it as current reality. Jurisprudentially, we
cling to the legal fictions, which have been demonstrably false
during the whole of our own lifetimes, that bargaining occurs
between individual merchants and customers, that goods are
custom-made, that any of us know the identity of the makers of
the products we use, or that we can effectively hold them to

* Elizabeth J. Cabraser is a partner in the litigation firm of Lieff Cabraser
Heimann & Bernstein LLP, San Francisco/New York. She teaches seminars
in class actions and complex litigation at Columbia University and University
of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall). The views expressed are those of the
author, derived from her experience as a plaintiffs' advocate in financial, tort,
and consumer class actions over the past 30 years.
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account based upon personal acquaintance, or local reputation. 1
We live, instead, in a faceless world of standardized products,
mass marketing, and advertising pitched to the broadest common
denominator.
Accordingly, if something goes wrong with a product sold to
millions, when a mass-marketed prescription drug proves
dangerous, 2 or when the purveyors of financial services, such as
credit cards or mortgages, devise schemes to nickel-and-dime their
customers, the consequences, to the individuals themselves (in the
case of drug-caused personal injury or death), or in the aggregate
(as the nickels and dimes of millions of cheated customers add up
into millions or billions of dollars) registers at the societal level.
The vindication of these transgressions becomes a matter of
overarching social and economic importance.
Certainly, the
average citizen persists in believing that the law is, or at least
aspires to be, effective at rectifying these breaches of the social
contract.
But courts have retreated from the effective
enforcement of our laws by denying class certification to such
claims in cases where significant common questions of law and
fact exist, and no superior alternative adjudication methods are
available. 3
Often, the justification for rejection of the class mechanism is
the court's refusal to conduct a complete conflicts of law analysis
that: 1)begins with an inquiry into whether claimed variations
among state laws rise to the level of true conflicts; 2)proceeds, in
the event of such conflict, to compare the relative interests and
1. Indeed, at their inception, internet-based flea markets, auctions, and
marketplaces such as ebay.com and craigslist were paradoxical reactions to,
and revolts against, the anonymity of everyday commerce.
2.

The emerging phenomenon of prescription drug mass marketing was

recently described as follows: "To do business, the pharmaceutical company
must convince prescribers to write prescriptions for its newly-patented drugs.
To this end, the pharmaceutical industry uses an array of marketing devices,
the most obvious being direct to consumer marketing, reflected in ubiquitous
advertisements." IMS Health Corp. v. Rowe, 532 F. Supp. 2d 153, 159 (D.
Me. 2007). The face-to-face aspect of prescription drug marketing survives in
the form of "detailing," the deployment of "a small army" of drug company
representatives (an estimated one detailer for every four or five U.S.
physicians) who visit physicians. "The detailers regularly visit prescribers at
their clinics and medical offices to persuade them to prescribe their products."
Standardized sales materials and pitches, and free samples and gifts, are

used. Id.
3.

See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
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contacts of the applicable jurisdictions as these pertain to the
issues and claims raised by the case; and 3)culminates in a choice
among the potentially applicable laws. In its stead, a number of
courts have recently short-circuited such analysis, substituting a
conclusory statement that all of the states in which the plaintiffs
reside have an interest in seeing their own law applied, and that
application of all such laws to the controversy in turn renders the
class procedure unmanageable. Failure to choose the governing
law bars access and thwarts the prospect of justice in claims that
through sheer number and/or small individual value, cannot or
should not be prosecuted on a piecemeal basis.
Unfortunately, many courts have thus regressed, rather than
advanced, in their willingness to address the mass wrongs that
define the dark side of our economy through the fairest, most
efficient, and most cost-effective procedure available: the modern
class action.
The excuse for rejecting this well-established
procedural mechanism is frequently that, because the claims of
wronged consumers are state law-based, and because these laws
vary in some particulars from state-to-state, it would be unfair not
only to defendants, but to the consumers themselves, to allow
them to band together in a single class for the unitary
adjudication of their claims.
Instead, the perfection of the
purported due process right of each consumer to assert her claims
under her home state's laws has been exploited to foreclose access
of these same consumers to any feasible legal proceeding. The
juggernaut of perfect home-state specificity has been deployed as
the nemesis of the good of class adjudication under a single state's
law.
There is no reason to require, or to allow, such a denial of
access in the guise of due process. Over 20years ago, in Phillips
Petroleum Co.v. Shutts,4 the United States Supreme Court upheld
the power of any single court to assert jurisdiction over, and
adjudicate the claims of a nationwide class of plaintiffs, so long as
certain hallmarks of due process are observed. 5 The Shutts court
4. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 (1985)
(hereinafter "Shutts").
5. The Supreme Court's landmark ruling in Shutts confirmed the
authority of state courts to exercise jurisdiction over class actions and certify
classes of nationwide scope.
This preclusive adjudicatory power over
multistate class claims was explicitly conditioned on the fulfillment of the
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articulated reliable ground rules for the choice-of-law analysis
that courts must conduct in the event of an actual conflict of law,
before they apply the forum state's law (or any other's) to the
claims of the entire class: the presence of "a significant contact or
significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such
that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally
unfair."6 Choice of law decisions that follow such analyses are
immune to constitutional challenge, and comport with due
process.
VARIATIONS VERSUS TRUE CONFLICTS

The "variations" in state laws that often trigger judicial
discomfort frequently do not rise to the level of "true conflicts" at
the Shutts level; that is, they would not affect the disposition of
claims based upon identical facts. Such variations do not require,
as a matter of due process, either a departure from the forum law,
or an application of all laws. In other words, "variations" do not
disable a single-state law choice. 7 If deference to differences in
state laws is nonetheless considered desirable, the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure provide a mechanism, Rule23(c)(5), under
which subclasses can be formed, corresponding to variations in
state laws where these could have a genuine impact on the
8
outcome at trial.
basic due process requirements. The Shutts decision enacted the due process
pillars of effective notice to and adequate representation of the class; the
opportunity of class members to be heard; and at least with respect to claims
for monetary damages certified under 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or its state analogs the ability of individuals to exclude themselves
from class membership by exercising an "opt out" right. Id. at 811-12. The
traditional corporate governance principles of "exit, voice, and loyalty" were
thus secured for the protection of unnamed class members. See John C.

Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty
in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 377 (2000).
6. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 818.
7. Id. at 818 (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13

(1981)); see also Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation,
71 N.Y.U.L. REV. 547 (1996).
8. Asserted differences in the laws of all states with respect to these
claims may readily be managed with jury instructions and special verdict
forms. Similarly, with respect to existing differences among the states' laws
for consumer fraud and punitive damage claims, those few states which
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It is a truism that there are variations in the laws of the
several states. Such variations may relate to the specifics of
remedies; the semantics in which the elements of a claim are
expressed; or the level of proof that is required (e.g.,
preponderance of the evidence vs. clear and convincing evidence)
to prove a specific claim or issue. However, the essential elements
of breach of contract, fraud, and negligence are (un)remarkably
uniform across the nation. 9 We are, with few exceptions, a nation
with a shared common law heritage. The basics of the law, as
articulated by Blackstone and other commentators, were spread
across the country as the law proceeded westward. The states
have borrowed from each other, and Twentieth Century
phenomena such as the American Law Institute's Restatements of
the Law have both documented and reinforced such reciprocity,
culminating in a high degree of uniformity. The concept of "failure
to warn" is of constant significance in product liability mass tort
litigation, as the states have adopted and described it at various
times, in various terms. Yet the law in the area of "failure to
warn" is essentially the same in all American jurisdictions.
would not recognize plaintiffs' claims in a given case may be carved out
through the special verdict form. Furthermore, should the need arise,
subclasses can be created to account for variances pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4).
See, e.g., In re Asbestos School Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422, 434 (E.D. Pa. 1984),
a/I'd, In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 995 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 852 (1986).
9. See Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1263 (11th Cir. 2004), cert.
denied sub nom. United Health Group, Inc. v. Klay, 543 U.S. 1081 (2005):
The application of various state laws would not be a bar where, as
here, the general policies underlying common law rules of contract
interpretation tend to be uniform ... A breach is a breach is a breach,
whether you are on the sunny shores of California or enjoying a
sweet afternoon breeze in New Jersey.
Klay, 382 F.3d at 1263.
Moreover, while the plaintiffs' breach of contract claims necessarily
implicate the contract law of all fifty states (since members of the putative
[physician] class practice in every jurisdiction in the country), the defendants
fail to argue on appeal that there are any relevant differences in the
applicable laws among these jurisdictions. Id.
The breach of contract claim in Klay failed to obtain class treatment
because in that case "while this relatively simple issue of law is common to
all the breach of contract claims, it is far outweighed by the individualized
issues of fact pertinent to these claims." Id. Unlike their patients, doctors (at
least in the view of the Klay court) still retain the power to bargain
individually with health care providers.

34

ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 14:29

Indeed, extraordinary similarities in this are highlighted by
powerful overlaps among the predicate liability requirements
common to the negligence, warranty and strict liability failure to
warn claims commonly asserted in pharmaceutical and medical
device mass torts:
Warning claims ...

tend to be treated the same way by the

courts, regardless of the underlying cause of action. Thus, with
regard to different theories of recovery, and particularly strict
liability and negligence, judges have opined that there is "no
practical difference," "no doctrinal distinction;" no "rigid
distinctions," a "strong resemblance" between the different
products liability theories, or that any distinction is "illusory."
Other courts have held that regardless of the underlying theory,
warning claims are "equivalent," "indistinguishable," "virtually
inextricable," "identical," "essentially the same," and are generally
measured by the same standards. 10
As Judge Spiegel concluded in the Telectronics medical device
litigation: "[A]ll states use the same elements to define a cause of
action in negligence." 1 1 Likewise, Judge Brimmer concluded after
considering the same question in the Copley pharmaceutical
litigation: "the standard for ordinary negligence does not
significantly differ throughout the country, and the differences
that do exist can be remedied through careful instructions to the
jury."

12

Whether the "variations" in the states' articulation of legal
doctrines such as negligence are substantial, or whether more
subtle "nuances" are meaningful in a specific case, is a matter of
ongoing debate. 13 What is equally clear is that, at the level of due
10. Louis R. Frumer & Melvin I. Friedman, 2 ProductsLiability, at 12-29
(1998).
11. In re Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc., 172 F.R.D. 271, 291 (S.D.
Ohio 1997).
12. In re Copley Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 485, 491 (D. Wyo.
1994).
13. Compare the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion in Klay, based on "genius,
general knowledge, and previous information," that as to the relevant
elements of the legal claim of breach of contract, "[a] breach is a breach is a
breach," 382 F.3d at 1263, with the Seventh Circuit's decision in In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995), reversing class
certification on a novel negligence theory because, while the laws relevant to
the claim arguably "differ among the states only in nuance ... [n]uance can be
important, and its significance is suggested by a comparison of differing state
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process, the choice of the forum state's law over another is proper,
as long as the variations that are actually relevant to the issues in
the case are not outcome-dispositive.1 4
A comparative
interest/contacts analysis, as between the forum state and the
other states implicated, need occur only in the event of a "true
conflict." 15 Otherwise, the forum law may be deployed without
transgressing due process. 16 In the case of a true conflict, a choice
must be made; however, regardless of who is disappointed, the
choice itself will not violate either side's due process rights so long
as it meets the constitutional choice of law criteria set forth in
Shutts, as

recently reaffirmed

by Franchise Tax Board of

pattern [jury] instructions on negligence and differing judicial formulations of
the meaning of negligence and the subordinate concepts. The voices of the
quasi-sovereigns that are the states of the United States sing negligence with
a different pitch." Id. at 1301.
14. See, e.g., Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1021 (9th Cir.
1998) (affirming the settlement of a nationwide consumer class action of
consumers who sought the replacement of defective door latches on a variety
of Chrysler minivans):
[T]here is no structural conflict of interest based on variations in
state law, ... and the differences in state remedies are not
sufficiently substantial so as warrant the creation of subclasses.
Representatives of other potential subclasses are included among the
named representatives, including owners of every minivan model.
However, even if the named representatives did not include a broad
cross-section of claimants, the prospects for irreparable conflict of
interest are minimal in this case because of the relatively small
differences in damages and potential remedies.
Id. The Hanlon class claims were brought under state law warranty and
consumer fraud theories. Id. at 1018.
15. If, and only if, a material or direct conflict on an outcome-dispositive
issue is identified, must the relative significance of the relationships of
various states to the claims at issue be analyzed, to assure that the choice
among their laws is "neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair" only unless
variations rise to the level of a "true conflict" - a difference that will decide
the outcome. See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, 644 F.2d 594, 616
(7th Cir. 1981). At least one court has recently recollected a central lesson of
Shutts: "A choice of law analysis is unnecessary where there is no actual
conflict because 'there can be no injury' in applying a particular state's law
absent a true conflict." French v. Eventually Yours Indus., 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 54550 at *18 (class certification granted) (citing Shutts, 472 U.S. at
816).
Without a true (e.g., dispositive) conflict of laws present, there is "no
need for extended constitutional discussion." Shutts, 472 U.S. at 844 (citing

Russell J. Weintraub, W4ho's Afraid of ConstitutionalLimitations on Choice of
Law, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 17, 18-24 (1981)).
16.

Shutts, 472 U.S. at 817-22.
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17
Californiav. Hyatt.
As with other good things, too much due process has proved to
be bad for the very class members whose procedural rights the
courts have undertaken to protect. For example, the Supreme

Court's 1997 Amchem decision

18

was both a high- and low-water

mark of due process protection for class members. Amchem,
echoing Shutts, reaffirmed the "core" policy of the class action: to
secure access to justice by enabling aggregation of small damage
claims "into something worth someone's (usually an attorney's)
labor. 19 Amchem also confirmed that the key to class certification
of damages claims, satisfaction of the "predominance" requirement
of Rule23(b)(3), 20 "is a test readily met in certain cases alleging
21
consumer or securities fraud or violations of the antitrust laws."
So far, so good. However, while acknowledging that "[E]ven mass
tort cases arising from a common cause or disaster may,
depending upon the circumstances, satisfy the predominance
requirement, 22 the Amchem majority proceeded to affirm the
rejection of a nationwide class settlement of asbestos injury and
17. In Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, a unanimous Court upheld as
constitutionally permissible the Nevada state court's determination to subject
a California tax-collection agency to suit by a tax protestor (and former
California resident) in Nevada, notwithstanding the immunity that the
agency would have enjoyed under California law. 538 U.S. 488, 499 (2003).
The Court noted that Nevada was not constitutionally required to apply
California's immunity statute in the face of its own conflicting public policy
with regard to immunity for its own counterpart agencies. Id. The Hyatt
decision reaffirmed that courts that conduct a faithful Shutts choice-of-law
analysis will be protected from constitutional "second-guessing" by the
federal appellate system; that the Supreme Court itself will respect their
choices of substantive law; and that the judgments implementing these
choices will stand.
18. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
19. Id. at 617 (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344
(1997)); see also Shutts, 472 U.S. at 813 ("The plaintiffs claim may be so
small, or the plaintiff so unfamiliar with the law, that he would not file suit
individually, nor would he affirmatively request inclusion in the class if such
a request were required by the Constitution").
20. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) requires that issues of law or fact common to
all class members predominate over any questions involving only individual
members. Rule 23 does not otherwise define, describe, or quantify the level
or degree of commonality that constitutes "predominance". Predominance
may thus be said to reside in the (presumably unjaundiced and farsighted)
eye of the judicial beholder.
21. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625.
22. Id.

2009] A SINGLE GOVERNING LAWFOR MASS CLAIMS

37

death claims that would have distributed billions of dollars to
claimants without the requirement of costly or protracted
litigation, in part because of factual and legal differences among
the dispersed class of victims. These differences, however, may
have been manageable in the trial context, via subclassing, and
23
need not have prevented the settlement of their claims.

The Amchem majority, in applying the predominance factors,
expressly distinguished between small claims, for which
certification remains (as a matter of both practicability and due
process) essential, and the presumably "high" individual damages
claims in which certification has been traditionally disfavored, due
to the supposedly "significant interest in individually controlling
the prevailing claims", and "substantial stake in making
individual decisions on whether and where to settle. '2 4 In
protecting these autonomy interests, the Amchem majority elected
to foreclose the opportunity of these same plaintiffs to participate
in a valuable settlement. Having been rejected at the highest
level, the settlement evaporated, and the class members whose
rights to choose and control their litigation destinies the Amchem
decision championed largely ended up as involuntary creditors in
interminable asbestos manufacturer bankruptcies. The Amchem
court destroyed the settlement in order to save it, and the perfect
once again defeated the good.
The sincerity of the Amchem majority in protecting the
idealized due process rights of class members cannot be
questioned, but what that distinguished coalition may not have
understood is that the bright line distinction it drew between
"high" value and "paltry" claims has become meaningless in many
mass torts, given the daunting cost of the experts necessary to
mount any successful individual trial. Litigants with all but the
most valuable claims are being priced out of individual
adjudication. An injury claim with expected damages in the
$75,000-$1million dollar range (if successful at trial and on
appeal) meets the threshold for federal diversity jurisdiction in
individual cases, and courts traditionally think of such claims as
too valuable to require class treatment or other aggregation. Yet
such cases cannot, these days, be presented cost-effectively,
23.
24.

See id. at 623.
Id. at 616-17.
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because the exercise of expert witnesses, jury consultants, trial
presentation aids, and pretrial discovery may easily exceed the
highest reasonably likely verdict. Nor do such claims become
feasible by factoring in punitive damages: the Supreme Court has
mandated de novo appeals of punitive damages verdicts, and have
25
drastically scaled back the size of punitive damages awards.
Even a wrongful death claim may be a "negative value" suit,
which by definition costs more to win than the reasonably
expected recovery, due to expert costs and the attrition tactics
which courts have increasingly tolerated, in contravention of the
administration of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1.26 Even
"high" value claims thus need the economies of scale of classwide
adjudication, for example, through the class wide trial of common
issues of law or fact under Rule23(c)(4).
A stark example is found in tobacco litigation, which has seen
27
few individual trials and even fewer smokers' judgments.
Smokers' death claims were demonstrably and notoriously
rendered cost ineffective by the tobacco industry's admitted
attrition tactics, including stonewalling discovery. 28

As one

25. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 530 U.S. 408 (2003);
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 provides that the Federal Rules, which include the
class action provisions of Rule 23, "should be construed and administered to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding."
27. The few smokers' claims that have resulted in plaintiffs' verdicts
have found themselves captive to repetitive appeal of punitive damages
awards, as defendants, using the Supreme Court's very recently developed
punitive damages limitation criteria, seek de novo review to reduce punitive
damages below the threshold of feasibility. See, e.g., the odyssey of Williams
v. Philip Morris Inc., which originally resulted in a $79.5 million punitive
award to the widow of a heavy cigarette smoker, and has long been mired in
appeals to the Oregon Court of Appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court (which
upheld the verdict), and the United States Supreme Court (which vacated it).
On remand, the Oregon Supreme court again upheld the original verdict, and
this term the U.S. Supreme Court again granted certiorari). See Philip
Morris USA, Inc. v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007); Williams v. Philip Morris
USA, Inc., 176 P.3d 1255 (Ore. 2008); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Williams,
128 S. Ct. 2904 (Or. 2008).
28. See, e.g., Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 414, 421 (D. N.J.
1993) ([T]he tobacco industry has taken the position that its members will
never settle a lawsuit which invokes claims that tobacco has caused injuries
to an individual... . the ability to outspend and over-litigate is... used to
persuade those attorneys and their clients who were 'foolish' enough to file
suit to voluntarily dismiss their claims.").
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tobacco company's general counsel was quoted, "To paraphrase
General Patton, the way we won these cases was not by spending
all of [our] money, but by making that other son of a bitch spend
his."29 Although it ultimately paid millions to settle state
governments' economic claims, the tobacco industry has never
voluntarily paid for the release of individual smokers' claims. It is
not irrational to suspect that other mass tort and consumer
litigation defendants will be tempted by this long-successful
example to emulate such attention tactics.
Only after the Florida Supreme Court, in Engle v. Liggett
Group, Inc.,30 granted, to the members of a decertified statewide
smokers' class, the res judicata benefit of the product defect and
liability findings made by the class trial jury (thereby requiring
individuals to prove only medical causation in their own cases and
nullifying the law of attrition) did individual tobacco death and
injury suits become economically feasible in Florida. Over 7,000
are now pending, managed jointly by the federal and state courts,
where fewer than 100 existed before. The trial time necessary for
each case has been reduced from weeks or months to hours or
days.
The Engle court, using a process it analogized to Federal
Rule23(c)(4)'s "issues" certification procedure, 3 1 recognized the
judicial economy interest in avoiding the prohibitively costly
relitigation, via identical witnesses and documents, of the tobacco
defendants' product, knowledge, conduct, and duty regarding
smoking and disease. The Engle PhaseItrial special verdict form
was held binding upon defendants in all class members'
subsequent actions. While choice of law was not a distracting
issue in Engle (the class was limited to Florida residents), Engle
marks a rare judicial recognition of the economic reality, in the
mass tort context, that limited judicial resources and high
litigation costs have obliterated the theoretical autonomy that
mass tort victims would otherwise enjoy in the absence of
aggregation, and that unitary treatment of common questions is
as essential to justice in the tort context as it is in "small" claim
consumer litigation. Such a recognition is equally crucial to the
29. Id.
30. 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006).
31. Id. at 1268-69.
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judicial will to conduct a rigorous choice of law in the classenabling manner approved in Shutts analyses, rather than default
to an "all states" approach that all too often rejects aggregation as
"unmanageable."

WHY ARE THE MEMBERS OF PROPOSED NATIONWIDE CLASSES

REPEATEDLY DENIED DUE PROCESS AT THE CHOICE OF LAW STAGE?
While it is beyond peradventure after Shutts that a court
may, in complete conformity with constitutional requirements,
select a single state's law to govern the claims of a nationwide
class, far more often than not courts considering class certification
decline to do so. 3 2 Such decisions endorse and apply the syllogism
that variations among the laws of states with any interest in the
dispute foreclose a choice of law, and that proceeding under
multiple laws instead is unmanageable. 3 3 That any effective
32. See, e.g., In re Paxil Litig., 218 F.R.D. 242, 250 (C.D. Cal. 2003); In re
Baycol Prods. Litig., 218 F.R.D. 197, 209 (D. Minn. 2003); In re Propulsid
Prods. Liab. Litig., 208 F.R.D. 133, 147 (E.D. La. 2002) (all denying class
treatment under the superiority requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) and
holding variations in state laws render a nationwide class unmanageable
without considering whether there were true or actual conflicts among the
relevant provisions of such laws that precluded forum law application, and
then by eschewing a true Shutts constitutionally permissible choice of law
determination). See also In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012,
1016 (7th Cir. 2002) (reversing nationwide class certification order of district
court under Indiana [forum] contact/interest analysis, applying instead the

principle of lex loci delicti choice-of-law rule); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig.,
239 F.R.D. 450, 458 (E.D. La. 2006) (concluding that law of each proposed

class members' home jurisdiction applied to their respective claims).
33. The MDL transferor courts who rejected class certification in Baycol,
Paxil, and Vioxx were jurists with considerable complex litigation experience,
expertise, and energy. Their tasks were significantly complicated by gaps
and paradoxes in the multidistrict litigation statute (28 U.S.C. § 1407) and
rules, which contain no choice-of-law principle; rather, the choice-of-law
rule(s) of the relevant transferor courts, as well as the forum state of the
transferor court, must be considered, which adds a dimension of confusion (or
at least tedium) to the choice of law analysis, unless class proponents take
the initiative to simplify the process by selecting an existing action, already
on file in the transferee court, as the vehicle for certification and trial of class
claims. Some courts such as Propulsid have rejected the common MDL
device of a "consolidated amended complaint" or "master complaint" as a
mere "administrative" filing, rather than as a real action originally filed in
the MDL forum. Other courts have urged the use of master complaints to
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management of the thousands of underlying claims as individual
cases was even less manageable is glossed over.
There are a number of incentives for the denial of class
treatment where due process allows (or compels) it, and where the
alternative of individual litigation (from a standpoint of cost, delay
and inconsistency) is worse. For the past decade, the class
certification decisions of the federal district courts have been
instantly reviewable, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(f), at the insistence of the losing side. Prior to the enactment of
Rule23(f), interlocutory review of class certification decisions was
available only through the writ of mandate procedure, and the
courts of appeal deferred to trial courts' class certification
decisions far more than is the current practice. Although the class
certification decision remains within the "broad discretion" of the
district court, the district courts' discretion is now micromanaged
by the Circuits. While "discretion" appears to be a neutral term,
in reality it is far more likely that a court of appeal, granting a
23(f) review petition, will reverse class certification, or affirm the
denial of class certification, than it will mandate the certification
of a class the trial court has denied, or affirm a grant of class
certification. There may thus be a persistent, albeit unintended or
unacknowledged institutional disincentive to tempt reversal by
certifying classes in cases in which the stakes are highest-the
certification of a nationwide class.
Class actions involve case management challenges, and no
class is more challenging, due to its sheer size, than a nationwide
class. Ironically, the choice of a single state's law to govern the
claims of such a class renders the trial of the case as simple as if a
single statewide class were involved. If it is constitutionally

solve the MDL choice of law conundrum. See "Unified and Consolidated
Complaints in Multidistrict Litigation," 132 F.R.D. 598 (presentation by Hon.
Diana E. Murphy on October 25, 1990 to the XXIII Meeting of Transferee
Judges sponsored by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation in Marcos
Island, Florida). Judge Murphy suggested that the filing of the unified
complaint in the transferee district supports the application of the choice-oflaw doctrine (and thus potentially the substantive law), of the transferee
court since, by filing any form of unified complaint, "all plaintiffs have, in
effect, filed a new complaint in the transferee court." Id. at 608. Until this
debate is resolved by statute, the precaution of utilizing (e.g., by amendment)
an existing MDL forum-filed complaint returns the choice-of-law process to
the application of a single (forum) state's choice-of-law rule.
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proper to do so, why do courts instead persist in shrinking from
the available choice of any single state's law, claiming they must
choose them all, and then throwing up their hands at the prospect
of managing 50 statewide classes? 34 It may be the mistaken view

that once an interest in each state's law is identified, that interest
may not be constitutionally subordinated to an interest in
uniformity or efficiency of, or access to, adjudication. Such is a
mistake.
A. Disenfranchisement Begins at Home: The Defendant's
Insistence on Application of Plaintiffs' Home State's Laws May
Foreclose Access to Adjudication on the Merits
It is frequently assumed (or at least argued by the defendants
as class action opponents) in class certification analysis, that the
members of a proposed plaintiff class must expect and prefer to
litigate their claims under their home state's laws. The average
layperson is likely unaware that states' laws vary, or that her
rights are defined by anything other than a common body of
"American" law. The fact that enforcement of such "presumed"
preference may cost class members the ability to have their claims
litigated at all is not sufficiently considered. A number of courts
34.

Courts declining to select a single state's law may instead elect,

under Rule 23(b)(3)/(c)(4), to "group" the states' laws into a few discrete
categories, and/or to select specific issues for class treatment, thereby
preserving the benefits of classwide treatment of common issues. See, e.g., In
re Teletronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 172 F.R.D. 271, 275-76 (S.D. Ohio 1997)
(approving class action settlement and reporting on success of summary jury
trial, as well as the utility of this approach).
Several decisions have
postulated the use of special verdicts corresponding to material differences.
See, e.g., In School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 995, 1010 (3d Cir. 1986). Such a
technique has been accomplished, as well as proposed, in the conduct of
actual trials, without undue complication. See, e.g., Ex ParteMasonite Corp.,
681 So.2d 1068, 1087 (Ala. 1996) (upholding certification of nationwide
homeowner class). In the Naef v. Masonite consumer class litigation, for
example, certification of a nationwide homeowner class was followed by an
initial trial phase at which the jury returned a special verdict on the
defectiveness of the hardboard siding product at issue in the form of answers
to a series of jury interrogatories, each corresponding to the controlling
definition of "defect" of the various states. See Carrell v. Masonite Corp., 775
So.2d 121 (Ala. 2000) (describing the litigation). The Alabama forum's old
school lex locus choice of law rule proscribed the court from applying one
state's law to all claims. This disadvantage did not foreclose nationwide class
treatment. Where there is a will, and sufficient judicial energy, there is a
way.
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have, in the not-too-distant past, thoughtfully considered this
argument, concluding that it is preferable to certify a class under
a single state's law, than to deny class treatment at all. Such
decisions were typically made in the context of deciding whether
or not to certify the "pendent" state law claims that accompanied a
federal statutory claim, such as violations of the federal securities
or antitrust laws.
In the securities fraud context, where federal statutory claims
are accompanied by analogous state law claims (for fraud or
negligence), the federal courts have understood and debunked the
fallacy that the states' interests in the application of their own
law, trumps these same states' interests in facilitating their
citizens' access to adjudication through class certification, even if
another state's law is applied to the claims. For example, in In re
Pizza Time Securities Litigation, the court applied California law
to the investors' state claims, utilizing the California forum's
"comparative impairment" choice of law rule, and observing:
Each of the interested jurisdictions shares the goal of
deterring fraudulent conduct, protecting those wrongly accused of
fraud, and providing a remedy for its residents who have been
defrauded. . ..

Each jurisdiction, including California, has laws

prohibiting fraud that accommodate these sometimes competing
concerns. It is evident that the similarities in these laws vastly
outweigh any differences. It is also apparent that each jurisdiction
would rather have the injuries of its citizens litigated and
compensated under another State's law than not litigated or
compensated at all.

35

Because the class was already unified by claims under a
single federal statute, the choice of a single state's law to certify
the accompanying claims may have appeared more pragmatic, or
proportional, than has the prospect of facing consumers from
50states who could, conceivably, assert their claims under as
many state consumer statutes or bodies of common law. The
absence of a federal statutory claim, however, should not change
the choice of law analysis. Indeed, consumers who do not have
federal substantive law to rely upon may be in far greater need of
a nationwide class than those who do. There is no federal
35. In re Pizza Time Sec. Litig., 112 F.R.D. 15, 20 (N.D. Cal. 1986)
(emphasis added).
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statutory or common law proceeding for recovery by defrauded or
injured consumers of most products or services. The unfettered
ability of manufacturers to broadcast products across the country
without accountability for the quality, safety, or reliability of their
goods has been an unfortunate byproduct of the unwillingness of
courts to select an appropriate state's law under which consumers
may pursue their claims. The quintessential due process right of
access to the tribunal may depend upon the court's choice of a
single state's law. Thus, it may be the refusal to choose the law,
rather than the recognition that all laws must be invoked, which
works a true due process denial on consumers.
As Justice Holmes' repeated use of the term vividly
illustrates, the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century
viewed the states as "quasi-sovereigns. ' 3 6 The limited liability
corporation was in its infancy, commerce was yet primarily intrastate, and the states were considered well able to police the doings
of the manufacturing corporations who were then artificial
creatures. But modern corporations have grown far beyond the
ability of their state parents to control them, especially when their
very jurisdiction over their unruly childrens' out-of-state
transgressions is questioned.
The alternative, simultaneous
enforcement by all states of their own laws against the
wrongdoing of foreign corporations, is at least as inconsistent and
unpredictable.
If, to paraphrase a landmark California consumer class action
decision, each state, like each consumer, "is left to assert [its]
rights if and when [it] can, there will at best be at least a random
'3 7
and fragmentary enforcement, if there is any at all."

36. In his famous dissent in Southern Pacific v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222

(1917), Justice Holmes intoned:

"the common law is not a brooding

omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasisovereign that can be identified... it is always the law of some State..." In
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., Justice Holmes extolled "quasi-sovereign"
Georgia's last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their
forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air. 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
Holmes' statement was recently cited to confirm the states' standing to
challenge federal EPA decisions in Massachusetts v. EPA. 127 S. Ct. 1438,
1454 (2007). If states are quasi-sovereign where their environments are
concerned, what about their economies?
37. Vasquez v. Superior Court, 484 P.2d 964, 968 (Cal. 1971). Vasquez
borrowed this theme, originated by Harry Kalven, Jr. and Maurice Rosenfield
in their seminal article Function of Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 689

2009] A SINGLE GOVERNING LAW FOR MASS CLAIMS

45

As a practical matter, the notion that the states have equal
interests in applying their own laws, whether the wrongdoer is
incorporated or headquartered there or not, is itself
unmanageable. There is no assurance that this co-equal interest
will be invoked in every state, leaving gaps in enforcement.
Moreover, the wholesale migration of state law class actions from
state to federal courts pursuant to the enactment of the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA") ensures that courts in all
states will not invoke their respective laws in response to
consumer complaints. Congress' stated intent to place claims
arising from nationwide product distribution under the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, despite a vacuum of federal
substantive law, both assures a gap in state-by-state enforcement,
and recognizes both the necessity and opportunity to choose one
state's law to apply to recently federalized consumer claims. In
the absence of a true conflict, the forum state's law will serve. In
the presence of a true conflict, the law of the state of the
defendant's (or its products) origin is frequently appropriate,
comporting as it does with both interest- and contacts-based
analysis. 38
The initiative to federalize most class actions that was
ultimately enacted as CAFA is rife with paradox and
contradiction.
CAFA's provisions proclaim exalted goals of
consumer protection, fair and efficient compensation of class
members, protection of interstate commerce, and marketplace

(1941), and applied to the modern consumer conundrum.
38. A state's interest in ensuring that its resident manufacturers and
distributors made products safe for public consumption is "not only a
cognizable interest but also the paramount interest in its law being enforced."
Butkera v. Hudson River Sloop "Clearwater", Inc., 93 A.2d 520, 522-23 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997); Gantes v. Kason Corp., 679 A.2d 106, 111-12 (N.J.
1996) (applying New Jersey law where malfunctioning machine made in New
Jersey killed a Georgia resident in Georgia). Although each state has an
interest in compensating its citizens and preventing unlawful business
conduct within its jurisdiction, none may have a significantly greater interest
than the state in which the defendant has formed, in which it has chosen to
headquarter, or in which it designs or makes the products at issue. Ysbrand
v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 81 P.3d 618, 626 (Okla. 2003) (applying law of
defendant's principal place of business to nationwide class alleging breach of
warranty with regard to minivan airbags); see also Samuel Issacharoff,
Getting Beyond Kansas, 74 UMKC L. REV. 613, 620 (2006).

46

ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW

[Vol. 14:29

innovation. 39 Once delivered to federal Court, "class members
with legitimate claims" are promised "fair and prompt
recoveries." 40 Moreover, CAFA does away with the $75,000 per
plaintiff diversity jurisdiction threshold in all cases brought as
class actions. CAFA's two new threshold requirements are simply

that the class consist of a hundred or more claimants, and that the
matter in controversy exceeds "the sum or value" of five million
41
dollars.
Yet CAFA contains no choice of law provisions to implement
these ideals and assure fair and prompt adjudication of the claims
of masses of consumers and tort victims statutorily catapulted
into federal court.
Indeed, in what has become "standard
operating procedure" taught in seminars on defending class
actions, defendants seek to eliminate class actions altogether in
nationwide consumer fraud cases- where class actions are
needed the most- with what has become a standard "Catch-22"
strategy: (1) remove all state court actions to federal court (made

39. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1711 (2005). Section
2(b) states:
(b) PURPOSES-The purposes of this Act are to(1) assure fair and prompt recoveries for class members with
legitimate
claims;
(2) restore the intent of the framers of the United States
Constitution by providing for Federal court consideration of
interstate cases of national importance under diversity
jurisdiction;
and
(3) benefit society by encouraging innovation and lowering
consumer prices.
40. Id. at §2(b)(1).
41. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).
(2) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value
of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is a class action in
which(A) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State
different from any defendant;
(B) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state or a
citizen or subject of a foreign state and any defendant is a citizen
of a State; or
(C) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State and
any defendant is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a
foreign state.
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easier by the enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,
which confers federal jurisdiction over nearly all class actions); (2)
transfer all of the actions into a single MDL proceeding; (3) argue
that the transferee court cannot apply the law of the defendant's
principal place of business to residents of other states, and must
instead apply the law of all 50 states (ostensibly to protect class
members' interests in seeing their own state's law applied, which
some courts have dubbed "the fox guarding the henhouse"); and
(4) the "coup de grace"- argue that because the court must apply
the laws of all 50 states, class certification must be denied because
common issues do not predominate and/or the case will be
unmanageable for trial. 42 Choice of law has not been forgotten by
Congress in enacting CAFA; it has been ignored. In 1994 for
example, the American Law Institute's Complex Litigation Project
issued a comprehensive proposal developed under the leading
federal proceduralists Arthur Miller and Mary Kay Kane, who
served as the Project's Reporters, to systemize and coordinate
federal and state complex litigation. 4 3 Its choice-of-law chapter
called for the adoption of a federal standard for choice-of-law and
uniform choice of law rules to govern state-law-based mass torts
and mass contract litigation. 44
The Project and its
recommendations were met with Congressional indifference;
federal choice-of-law appears to have been at least a decade ahead
of its time. When CAFA was whisked through Congress early in
2005, its sponsors enforced a "no amendments" rule, which
brushed aside a so-called "law professors' amendment," which was
a Shutts-derived choice of law provision. It, along with efforts to
correct typos and conflicting or nonsensical terminology, were
casualties of expediency. As an ironic result of this Congressional
rejection of a more class-specific rule, the Shutts formula remains
the overarching rule for all cases, of all types, in all courts,
including all CAFA class actions.
Some courts have not hesitated to certify a national class
under a single state's law, such as New Jersey's Consumer Fraud
Act, the ("NJCFA"), where a New Jersey "[d]efendant's alleged
42. See, e.g., In re Pharmaceutical Ind. Avg. Wholesale Price Litig., 252
F.R.D. 83, 92-93 (D. Mass. 2008) (hereinafter "AWP").
43. See
AM.
LAW
INST.,
COMPLEX
LITIGATION:
STATUTORY
RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS (1994).
44. Id. at 305-436.
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misrepresentations
and
omissions
concerning
[health
consequences] are alleged to be uniform" and disseminated
"nationwide." 45 As the Nafar Court explained:
The NJCFA will apply to all class members because this
particular law governs Defendant's behavior and uniform policies.
New Jersey has a strong interest in this litigation because the
case's outcome will likely affect Defendant's nationwide behavior.
As stated in Dal Ponte,
Many states can claim members of the proposed class as
residents, including New Jersey. These contacts are clearly
relevant to the litigation, as each state has an interest in applying
its consumer fraud laws to ensure that its citizens and
domiciliaries are protected and compensated.
It is equally
apparent, however, that the interests of these states would not be
frustrated by the application of the NJCFA.
Indeed, the NJCFA is one of this nation's strongest consumer
protection laws and its application will not frustrate other states'
46
consumer protection laws.
Despite the CAFA kibosh, efforts (by law professors, no less)
to formulate fair and predictable choice-of-law alternatives still
persist. Foremost among these is the American Law Institute's
choice of law approach, as featured in its ongoing Aggregate
Litigation project:
§ 2.05 Choice of Law
(a) To determine whether multiple claims involve
common issues, the court must ascertain the substantive
law governing those issues.
(b) The court may authorize aggregate treatment of
multiple claims, or of a common issue therein, when the
court determines that
(1) a single body of law applies to all such claims or
issues;

45. Nafar v. Hollywood Tanning Sys., Inc., 2008 WL 3821776, at *6
(D.N.J. Aug. 12, 2008).
46. Id. at *6 (citing Dal Ponte v. American Mortgage Express Corp., 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57675, at *18-20).
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(2) different claims or issues are subject to different
bodies of law that are the same in functional content;
or
(3) different claims or issues are subject to different
bodies of law that are not the same in functional
content but do present a limited number of patterns
that the court, for reasons articulated pursuant to
§2.12, can manage by means of identified procedures
47
at trial.
As the Reporters explain:
e. Manageablepatterns. Subsection (b)(3) recognizes that
choice-of-law considerations should not defeat aggregate
treatment when the court determines that a manageable
number of patterns exist in the relevant bodies of
substantive law and explains their suitability for
treatment on an aggregate basis as part of its trial plan
under §2.12. That 50 different states' laws might apply to
a set of claims does not necessarily mean that 50 radically
different variations in functional content exist.
Subsection (b)(3) recognizes that different states' laws can
form manageable clusters or groupings, even when they
are not entirely uniform. Common issues may exist
within the respective clusters so as to make aggregate
48
treatment permissible.
Under §2.05's subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2), a single state's law
is applied. This approach is, as the Reporters note, permitted by
Shutts. 49 Subsection (b)(3) involves the identification of common

47.

AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION §

2.05 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2008). As Draft 1 notes, subsection (b) of this
section does not seek to provide an "exhaustive typology of permissible
approaches to choice of law in aggregate litigation. Subsection (b), instead,
pursues the more limited goal of identifying three situations where a
substantial consensus has emerged in existing law that choice-of-law
considerations should pose no insurmountable barrier to aggregation." Id. at
cmt. b.
48. Id. at cmt. e.
49. The Reporters invoke Shutts, 472 U.S. at 823 (noting that "a state
court may be free to apply one of several choices of law" as long as the choice
made is not arbitrary), and observe: "If anything, the Supreme Court's
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patterns and the resulting grouping of claims.
How is such "grouping" accomplished? Very carefully. As the
ALI Reporters advise:
Subsection (b)(3) nonetheless counsels caution, requiring
that the court not only identify the nature and number of
variations in substantive law but also articulate a plan
for how those variations can be handled on an aggregate
basis while respecting their differences in content. In
order to conduct such an inquiry, the court may need to
accumulate and evaluate statutes, common-law decisions,
and jury instructions from multiple jurisdictions. The
court may reduce the burden on itself, however, by calling
for submissions from the parties on these points. The
court also might consider the appointment of an expert to
assist the court in the choice-of-law analysis, with the
parties bearing the expense associated with that
50
appointment.
Examples of the Subsection (b)(7) approach (the identification
of a manageable number of patterns in substantive law) cited by
the Reporters include In re School Asbestos Litig.; In re Prudential
Ins. Co. of America Sales Practices Litig.; Telectronics; AWP; and
In re LILCO Sec. Litig. 51 The determination of manageability is
made by the court, which tests the assertions of manageability by
class proponents.

52

decisions since Shutts underscore even further the latitude available to courts
in the making of a nonarbitrary choice of law." See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman,
486 U.S. 717, 727 (1988) (recognizing that "it is frequently the case under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause that a court can lawfully apply either the law of
one State or the contrary law of another"). AM. LAw INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.05, reporter's cmt. b. (Tentative Draft
No. 1, 2008).
50. Id. at cmt. e.
51. In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 995, 1010 (3d Cir. 1986); In re
Prudential Ins. Co. of America Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 315 (3d
Cir. 1998); In re Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc., 172 F.R.D. 271, 293-94
(S.D. Ohio 1997); In re LILCO Sec. Litig., 112 F.R.D. 663, 670 ( E.D.N.Y.
1986); AWP, 252 F.R.D. at 92; see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION,
FOURTH § 22.317 (Federal Judicial Center 2004) (hereinafter 'MCL").
52. Cole v. General Motors Corp., 484 F.3d 717, 725-726 (5th Cir. 2007).
See also In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., 245 F.R.D. 279, 294 (N.D.
Ohio 2007) ("[A] court could manage the differences in medical monitoring
law among the eight states chosen by the . . .plaintiffs by holding separate
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The Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation draft is
intended as a functional and practical document, and its choice-oflaw alternatives (lex loci; single state selection; grouping of similar
-laws) are grounded in existing law. To assure that the choice from
among these alternatives promotes a manageable and meaningful
trial, or, as the Reporters term it, "judicial feasibility," the Project
recommends that a "trial plan" be adopted, to translate
aggregation theory into manageable practice:
§2.12 Trial Plan for Aggregation
(a) In ordering the aggregate treatment of a common
issue or of related claims, the court should adopt a trial
plan that explains
(1) the justification for aggregate treatment, as
compared to the realistic procedural alternatives for
treatment of the common issue;
(2) the specific procedures to be used in the aggregate
proceeding to determine the common issue, insofar as
aggregate treatment is so confined; and
(3) the anticipated effect that a determination of the
common issue will have upon other proceedings on
individual issues.
(b) In developing the trial plan described in subsection
(a), the court should resolve any pertinent disputes
53
concerning the feasibility of aggregate treatment.
Trial plans have become established fixtures of class
certification briefing, and serve to enable claims of commonality,
efficacy, and manageability to be judicially tested for practicability
and fairness. While some courts have erected the "trial plan" as
an additional barrier to class treatment, others, like Copley and
Telectronics courts, have included or appended detailed trial plans
trials for each state-wide subclass, or perhaps a combined trial for a few
statewide subclasses, where the law in those states is similar enough to allow
creation of jury instructions and a verdict form that is not too complex.").
53. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION §
2.12 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2008).
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to their class certification decisions, specifying the issues to be
tried on a classwide basis, the groupings of applicable law, and the
issues reserved for subsequent individual treatment. 54 Other
courts, facing multistate consumer claims in the context of
multidistrict litigation that also asserts federal RICO claims, have
recognized pragmatically that the determination of this shared
federal claim may moot the need to choose among the states. Such
courts have elected to proceed with RICO classes and defer
addressing state law claims. 55
Other courts have selected
"exemplar states," adopting a "bellwether" approach to a
significant state's classes. 56
CONCLUSION

The determination of Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule23(b) "superiority,"
which depends upon the predominance of common issues of law or
fact, and upon the manageability of the certified claims as a class
action, is, as set forth in the Federal Rules themselves, an
inherently relativistic, comparative exercise. All too often, courts
do not treat it as such, instead insisting that the certification of a
nationwide class be "superior" in absolute terms: that is, that it be
54. See, e.g., Copley, 161 F.R.D. 456, 467 (D. Wyo. 1995).
55. See In re Lupron Marketing and States Practices Litigation,
228 F.R.D. 75 (D. Mass. 2005); In re Zyprexa Products Liability Litigation,
253 F.R.D. 69 (E.D.N.Y 2008); In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price
Litig., 230 F.R.D. 61 (D. Mass. 2005) (court certified a Massachusetts
standards class and deferred other state law claims).
56. Many MDL courts, in mass torts and purchase claims contexts, have
adopted what is often called the "bellwether" trial approach to selecting
exemplar individual plaintiffs, defendants, or classes for MDL trials to
advance the litigation. See, e.g., In re MTBE Prod. Liab. Litig. (MDL
No. 1358) 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45543 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (describing the Rule
42(b)-based bellwether trial approach and finding it "warranted by the sheer
size of this action, the need for expeditious resolution, judicial economy, and
the convenience of the court, the jury, and the parties ....
");In re Pharm.
Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig. (MDL No. 1456), 233 F.R.D. 229 (D.
Mass. 2006) (granting certification of three classes for trial against five "Fast
Track" defendants). As the Manual for Complex Litigation 4th, § 20.132
advises: "Prior to recommending remand, the transferee court could conduct
a bellwether trial of a centralized action or actions originally filed in the
transferee district, the results of which (1) may, upon the consent of parties to
constituent actions not filed in the transferee district, be binding on those
parties and actions, or (2) may otherwise promote settlement in the
remaining actions." See MCL, supra note 52, at § 20.132.
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perfect, without management challenges, or other logistical
drawbacks. To insist upon such perfection violates Rule23(b)(3)
itself, which requires the comparison of the class action to other,
existing, available procedures. Thus, a class action, whether it be
statewide or nationwide, need not be perfect; instead, it must
simply be better than other available alternatives to enable class
members to adjudicate their claims, on the merits. In the nonclass context, the Supreme Court has reiterated that choice of law
in the case of conflict is neither an easy nor foolproof exercise, nor
need it be "right" in the absolute sense (much less pleasing to both
sides, one of whom is bound to be aggrieved) - in order to pass
constitutional muster. 5 7
Class certification is a procedural
exercise, without its own substantive law, and consumers'
substantive rights must not be abridged because they are arrayed
in class formation.
While the stakes may be raised when small claims are
aggregated in a class action, this is no excuse to recoil from
unitary determination. Indeed, it is the animating principle of
class actions that relief, recovery, compensation, and deterrence
shall be proportional to the misconduct, wrong, and harm. 58 To
erect choice of law as a barrier to "fair and prompt" adjudication
on the merits - to fail to choose - may work the cruelest due

process deprivation of all.

57. Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 499 (2003).
58. See Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1274 (11th Cir. 2004)
stating: "It would be unjust to allow corporations to engage in rampant and
systematic wrongdoing and then allow them to avoid a class action because
the consequences of being held accountable for their misdeeds would be
financially ruinous. We are courts of justice, and can give the defendants only
that which they deserve."

